Scotland’s draft interim constitution: limiting or liberating? by Boyle, Katie et al.
democraticaudit.com http://www.democraticaudit.com/?p=6203
By Democratic Audit
Scotland’s draft interim constitution: limiting or liberating?
In part two of our piece in which experts give their views on the Scottish Government’s draft interim constitution,
we hear from Katie Boyle of the University of Limerick, Stirling University’s Ben Saunders, and Glasgow
University’s Thomas Lundberg. They weigh up whether the document is up to the task of taking Scotland through
the difficult transition to independence in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote. 
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Katie Boyle, Economic and Social Research Council Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh and
Lecturer in International Human Rights, University of Limerick.
This consultation paper makes a contribution to engendering legitimacy in the process by
informing the debate and
allowing voters the opportunity to consult on the proposed terms of an interim constitution should
Scotland vote yes in the referendum. On the other hand, there is still much that is unclear, such
as what the terms of reference, procedures and mechanisms for participation and inclusion in
the Constitutional Convention process would be – so as to ensure, for example, that minority or
marginalised groups are heard in what could potentially be an exercise of elite or majoritarian decision making. At
the very least, it is notable that the proposed Bill ensures the Convention would operate independent of the
Scottish Government and Parliament.
Of course, even if Scotland does vote yes, the eventual enactment of the proposed interim Bill is also wholly
dependent on the relevant reserved powers being devolved to the Scottish Parliament by the UK Parliament in
advance of independence day. For example, under the current constitutional framework it would be beyond the
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament to declare independence and beyond the executive
competence of the Scottish Government to negotiate membership of international organisations – each of which
together with the Bill itself (the purpose of which is to amend the constitution), would require the transfer of a
number of reserved matters. This transfer may be difficult to secure and could be further complicated by the
composition of a newly elected UK Parliament in the 2015 general election.
Dr Ben Saunders, Lecturer in Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy, Stirling University
The Scottish Government’s consultation document claims that a written constitution is
rendered “problematic, if not impossible” (p. 27) in the UK by the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, according to which a current parliament cannot bind its successors. However, the
problem is not where sovereignty resides, but its absoluteness.
The draft Scottish constitution holds that the people are sovereign (§2), yet this is limited by
the constitution itself (§3(4)). If the constitution enshrines some particular policy – such as
nuclear disarmament (§23) – then there is now something that the people cannot do, at least without
constitutional amendment. These limits may be relatively insignificant if the constitution itself reflects the will of
the people. But, so long as it does, there is no real need for it.
An enshrined constitution only acts as a real constraint when it prevents something that might otherwise have
been done from occurring. But, if that ever happens, then the people of some past time have prevented the then
current people from doing what they will. In practice, the constitution allows decisions by past generations to bind
future generations. This is not only democratically dubious, but also unlikely to foster the long-term decision-
making that the draft-framers apparently want (p. 44).
Dr Thomas Lundberg, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow University
The SNP’s draft Scottish Independence Bill provides an interim constitution that is just good
enough to tide Scotland over in the event of a vote for independence in September. Aware that it
is very short on detail, the Scottish Government notes that the constitution is temporary and that
a constitutional convention, independent of the government, would later draft a permanent
constitution. Furthermore, aspects of the Scotland Act 1998 and its amendments would continue
to operate alongside the interim constitution.
Aside from wanting to turn public attention away from the (perhaps empty) promises of extra devolution recently
made by the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and Labour, the SNP’s rationale for publishing this bill now may
have to do with convincing the public that a ‘yes’ vote is not necessarily a vote for the SNP, but for a new
constitutional order. The interim constitution is rather vague, and the references to popular sovereignty
unremarkable when compared to other democratic constitutions around the world. Indeed, what is remarkable is
that the SNP can score political points because the uncodified (‘unwritten’) British constitution is so unusual
among democracies, and parliamentary, not popular, sovereignty lies at its centre. Ultimately, the interim
constitution fits well into the Yes Scotland campaign’s focus on enhancing democracy.
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